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1. 
Asquith suggests that informal logic, or the theory or philosophy of argument, may be 
usefully compared with science. The basis for this analogy is to be found, he says, in a number of 
similarities. These are (1) both deal with complex situations; (2) both try to describe or 
reconstruct what is going on in those situations; (3) both are able to do so in various ways--that 
is, there is a plurality of feasible descriptions and reconstructions; (4) both seek to transmit to 
students and others claims about the subject area and skills of handling material; and (5) both use 
illustrations and examples. Yet, there is major difference, acknowledged by Asquith, namely (6), 
whereas science seeks to explain and predict what is going on, in informal logic, one seeks not to 
predict the nature of arguments, but to evaluate them. 
This difference strikes me as crucial, and would deem the cited similarities to be somewhat 
less significant. Similarities (1) – (5) would  apply as much to music analysis, law, book 
reviewing, film criticism, or ethics and science, as they do to informal logic or the theory of 
argument, and yet these pursuits are not scientific in any common sense of the term.  
I see the interpretive and evaluative functions as central to any philosophical study of 
argument, and indeed these are emphasized by Asquith in his paper. In view of the centrality of 
evaluation, I find the analogy with Kuhn’s theory of understanding and progress in science to be 
somewhat off-the-mark, especially if (as would seem to be the case here) we are looking 
primarily at the study of argument from within philosophy and informal logic, as distinct from 
linguistics or communication theory. 
2. 
Asquith says there are “linguistic, anthropomorphic, psychological, and rhetorical accounts 
of arguments. He does not tell us whose theory he would put in which category, nor does he 
mention logical, philosophical, or critical accounts – despite his later emphasis on interpretation 
and assessment. The categorization strikes me as a little strange and not terribly helpful.  Later, 
Asquith refers to entailment theory (which I take to be what is commonly called Deductivism), 
dialogue theory, and doubt theory.  His references cite works by Johnson and Blair and by 
myself, but it is not clear in which of these categories our work would fall; nor is clear whether 
the pragma-dialectical theories of Frans van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, and their Amsterdam 
colleagues would count as dialogue theories or as doubt theories. Asquith’s point that different 
and incompatible things are going on in informal logic (or, if you prefer, Argumentation Theory, 
or the theory or philosophy of argument) is quite correct--and this may be regrettable--but his 
survey of what’s happening seems selective and a little hasty. 
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3. 
Despite these caveats, it may be useful to reflect on the present state of these disciplines 
from a broadly Kuhnian perspective. It seems to me clear that there is no one paradigm accepted 
by the scholars who study argument and informal logic. I cannot pronounce so confidently on 
linguistics and communication studies, so I will stay within philosophy, which is also Asquith’s 
home discipline and also highly relevant as the discipline within which most courses on critical 
thinking and practical argument are commonly taught. Within philosophy it is not entirely 
obvious that the lack of a paradigm is regrettable. Questions tend to fall within philosophy 
precisely because they are intractable and admit of various responses. In comparable areas of 
normative philosophy such as ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of law, there are commonly 
several actively promulgated theories, not one accepted paradigm. By and large, philosophy 
tends not to have the hierarchical power structures that favor the dissemination of paradigms – 
although some individuals, locations, texts and institutions do have more power or influence than 
others. 
Suppose that there are--as I think there are--several distinct, rather plausible, ways of 
reconstructing an argument from a conversation or an oral text. (For example, one might, for 
example, add ‘missing premises’ or ‘missing conclusions’, or delete or rearrange background 
material according to several different policies or not at all; one might take written arguments as 
a basis for approaching oral ones, or vice versa.)  If this is the case, it is not clear that things 
would somehow be better if we were to all accept the same approach, on the basis of some kind 
of paradigm or exemplar we all agreed to adopt as the basis for our research and teaching. 
Asquith is correct in his observation that there is no paradigm in argument studies/informal logic, 
but whether this lack is regrettable, and why it is or isn’t, seem to me to be highly discussable 
and important issues. 
4. 
The examples cited by Asquith seem to me to be too short, simple and clear to be suitable 
paradigms for a discipline founded on the claim that formal logic could not plausibly describe, 
interpret, and evaluate many arguments in natural language. 
5. 
I now come to the issue of the reconstruction of arguments and the viability of ceteris 
paribus rules. I appreciate Asquith’s reference to my work in “The Poverty of Formalism” and 
agree with his sense that if there are going to be rules in this area, they will be ceteris paribus 
rules. However, I would take issue with some of what he says about ceteris paribus rules. 
Asquith says there are two possibilities if one attempts to learn how to reconstruct arguments by 
using such rules. Either (a) one will have available a full listing of all the conditions under which 
things are equal or not; or (b) one will have a set of rules that one can use to apply the ceteris 
paribus rules.  I agree with Asquith that (b) is a non-starter because it will lead to a regress of 
rules. I also agree that we do not have (a).  
Note, however, that such gaps do not appear only in the area of informal logic and the 
study of argument. If I say that other things being equal, if you throw a lit match onto a 
wheatfield, you will cause a fire, this too is a ceteris paribus remark. And if I say that if you 
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throw a lit match onto a wheatfield you will cause a fire, that claim can be true only if it is 
interpreted as having an implicit ceteris paribus qualification. Such claims may be acceptable 
and useful without my listing all the things that might possibly intervene to prevent a fire. 
(Somebody comes along with water guns and sprays the math; there is a sudden storm; a dog 
happens to urinate in just the spot where the match lands, at just the right time to put out the 
flame; and so on and so forth. Note: and so on and so forth, which is the most important part 
here.). The same is true, I think, if I say that ceteris paribus--other things being equal, ‘normally’ 
or prima facie--people should keep their promises. Such generalizations play a fundamental role 
in science and in life. They do not become unintelligible or useless because we are unable to give 
an exhaustive list of all the ways (a massive invasion, a sudden disability, insanity on the part of 
one of the parties, the need to run off to save a life, or whatever) in which normal circumstances 
might fail to obtain. 
6. 
Two questions arise here. First, is it a tough problem for the theory and pedagogy of 
argument evaluation, that one has to use ceteris paribus rules when offering guidance on the 
tough topic of argument interpretation and reconstruction? Second, if this is a problem, could it 
be solved by the use of exemplars serving (roughly) the role of Kuhnian paradigms?  These are 
both deep questions, and I can only suggest answers in the time allowed to me here. To the first 
question, I am inclined to say that we are going to have to use judgment in applying rules, and 
this is inevitable not only in informal logic but in many other pursuits. The more specific and 
clear our rules are, the better, and the more agreement we have on how to use them, the better. 
But I don’t think the elimination of ceteris paribus clauses is going to be possible. And I would 
submit that if formal logic rules are going to be applied to arguments expressed in natural 
language, ceteris paribus rules will also be needed at some points, as regards translation from a 
natural language to a formal one. I am not convinced that we have a deep problem here.  
But suppose, for the sake of argument, that we do. Then the question would be, could we 
solve this problem by having a paradigm or exemplar, which would in some way embody and 
communicate tacit knowledge? The suggestion is a deeply interesting one, I think. Let me note 
that most textbook authors include examples and illustrations as well as rules, on such matters 
as argument reconstruction. By this practice, they suggest that some work is done by the 
examples, some by the rules--and that seems to me to be realistic. To use the exemplar as an 
exemplar, one would have to see how and why other cases were relevantly similar to it, and the 
articulated rules would specify some of the features to look for.  
Is Asquith suggesting that roughly Kuhnian paradigms would be exemplars so powerful 
that there would be no need to articulate any rules alongside them? (‘Here is an argument with a 
missing conclusion, indicated by a rhetorical question couched in emotionally loaded 
language.’) The textbook author would not even need to say that generally, in such cases, the 
writer or speaker is making a claim that may, given the presence of other statements plausibly 
construable as premises, be interpreted as a conclusion. His or her example would be so vivid 
and powerful that it would stand alone. This does not seem to me plausible.)  
Good examples on which there is broad agreement can be powerful tools for teaching and 
research, but it seems to me that they would suggest ceteris paribus rules, rather than replacing 
them. What ceteris paribus rules point to is the need for judgment. I suspect that the notion of 
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tacit knowledge, far from replacing the need for judgment, is another way of pointing to the fact 
that some people seem to have it while others don’t. They have this tacit knowledge of context, 
or background, or relevant skills, or whatever. And if we try to spell out what this tacit 
knowledge amounts to, we will have trouble. After all, it’s tacit knowledge, that’s the point. I 
suspect that, in attempting to understand tacit knowledge, we will arrive back at ceteris paribus 
rules or something like them. But I won’t claim to know this is right--not even tacitly. 
 
   
